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The Earth Belongs to the Living, or at Least It Should: The 
Troubling Difficulty of Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees* 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, the public performance of music has been a 
powerful force in culture and entertainment. Those providing services 
to the public, such as bars and restaurants, began to play music for 
customers. However, unauthorized performance of compositions in 
public places became a considerable problem for composers, as they 
would not receive compensation in exchange for the public use of 
their work.1 Eventually, it became evident that it was impractical for 
composers to negotiate licenses with individual music users on an ad 
hoc basis.2 
In the early twentieth century, a group of composers and 
musicians responded to this problem by creating performance rights 
organizations (“PROs”), including the American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (“BMI”). These PROs would handle the administrative 
rigors of licensing and, in the process, ensure composers received the 
royalties owed to them.3 
In essence, PROs are performance rights licensing collectives 
that license public performance rights for songs on behalf of the 
owners of those songs.4 PROs license songs to music users, such as 
bars, restaurants, and coffee shops, that play those songs for their 
patrons.5 Further, PROs license public performance rights on behalf 
of their members or affiliates, which include songwriters, producers, 
performers, or anyone else who has an ownership interest in the 
rights to a given song and permits a PRO to license it.6 Thus, PROs 
act as important middlemen between artists and music—it would be 
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 1. See Mary Katherine Kennedy, Recent Development, Blanket Licensing of Music 
Performing Rights: Possible Solutions to the Copyright-Antitrust Conflict, 37 VAND. L. 
REV. 183, 186 (1984); see also Danielle Ely, A Law Student’s Perspective: Don’t Believe Me 
Just Watch: A 100% Licensing System Would Stifle Collaboration and Creativity Among 
Songwriters, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2016, at 48, 48. 
 2. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 186. 
 3. See id. at 184. 
 4. See Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 183, 193 (2016). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
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logistically untenable for artists and songwriters to license their songs 
to thousands of bars and restaurants on an individual basis and collect 
and distribute royalties on those songs.7 Today, PROs account for 
over $2 billion in annual U.S. revenue.8 
Since 1940, BMI and ASCAP have controlled the performance 
rights licensing market by a wide margin as the two largest PROs in 
terms of repertoire.9 Today, there are only four prominent PROs in 
the United States: BMI, ASCAP, the Society of European Stage 
Authors and Composers (“SESAC”), and Global Music Rights 
(“GMR”).10 ASCAP and BMI, however, remain the preeminent 
players in the industry, controlling about ninety percent of the 
performance rights licensing market.11 This near-complete 
domination of the market by two PROs has led to concerns of 
anticompetitive behavior over the past seventy-five years, and, as a 
result, BMI and ASCAP have defended themselves in antitrust 
litigation.12 
Antitrust concerns in the public performance licensing space 
focus on market domination by only two PROs because of the fear 
that this could lead to a monopoly.13 In addition, the U.S. Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) has attacked some specific ways that PROs issue 
licenses, arguing that the practices are an illegal restraint on trade and 
that “the pooling of compositions .	.	. [has] permitted the performing 
rights organizations to charge arbitrary prices.”14 Since only two 
PROs are dominant in the industry, the government has been 
concerned for years about the potential for parallel pricing and tacit 
collusion to remove meaningful competition from the marketplace.15 
In response to these antitrust concerns, the DOJ has sought to 
regulate PROs over the years through consent decrees that “prevent 
 
 7. See id. at 187. 
 8. Steven J. Gagliano, Comment, Consent Decrees in the Streaming Era: Digital 
Withdrawal, Fractional Licensing, and §	114(I), 10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 317, 
322 (2017). 
 9. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188 (“ASCAP and BMI, through their members, 
control the performance rights to virtually every domestic copyrighted composition.”); 
Carly Olson, Comment, Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In Re 
THP, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 279 (2012) (stating that BMI and ASCAP 
“have come to dominate the field of music licensing”). 
 10. See Gabriella A. Conte, Note, “Waiting on the (Music) World to Change”: 
Licensing in the Digital Age of Music, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 323, 326 (2017). 
 11. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 330. 
 12. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188−89. 
 13. See id. at 189. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See García, supra note 4, at 188. 
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‘the aggregation of public performance rights in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.’”16 The government is able to exercise a measure 
of control over PROs by including ground rules and restrictions for 
PROs in the terms of each consent decree.17 The terms of these 
consent decrees are legally binding against PROs and, in essence, 
serve as governmental regulations on the performance rights licensing 
industry.18 
In recent years, there has been controversy surrounding the 
antitrust consent decree between the DOJ and BMI, which the two 
first entered into in 1966 and most recently amended in 1994.19 
During the lifetime of this decree, the circumstances surrounding the 
performance rights licensing industry have changed drastically due to 
advances in technology—most notably, the streaming technology 
surrounding digital music.20 
 
 16. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 320 (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE CLOSING OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S 
REVIEW OF THE ASCAP & BMI CONSENT DECREES 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/file/882101/download [https://perma.cc/N8ZW-PWQF]). 
 17. See Robert R. Zitko, The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judgments, 1994 
U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 241 (“A consent judgment is a valuable procedural tool which not 
only allows parties to achieve settlement, but also allows courts to retain jurisdiction over 
parties to enforce underlying settlement agreements.”); David S. Konczal, Note, Ruing 
Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees and an 
Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 130−31 (1996) (“Consent decrees are extremely 
attractive to both the Antitrust Division and defendants, primarily because of the 
avoidance of time consuming and expensive litigation.”). See generally Charles F. Phillips, 
Jr., The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1961) 
(discussing the role of consent decrees in antitrust enforcement). 
 18. “A consent decree is a negotiated settlement of a case brought in equity that is 
enforced through the court’s [inherent] power to enforce [its own] equitable decrees or 
orders.” David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform 
Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Second Circuit’s 
Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239 n.5 (1993). An antitrust consent decree also 
has been defined as “an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the Attorney 
General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct challenged by the Attorney 
General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or related 
statutes.” ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG., REP. ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IX 
(Comm. Print 1959). 
 19. See generally United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(discussing the BMI consent decree). For a detailed recapitulation of the dispute between 
the DOJ and BMI/ASCAP and the major points of contention, see García, supra note 4, at 
195−96. 
 20. See Conte, supra note 10, at 325 (“A major issue with the current regulation of 
music licensing is the failure to account for today’s commanding digital music presence. 
Music in digital form, such as online radio, paid streaming subscription services, and 
downloadable song purchases has been on the rise since 2003. Yet, the instruments 
governing music licensing have not been updated in decades.”); Gagliano, supra note 8, at 
318−19. 
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Digital streaming technology has completely changed the way 
that performance rights licensing operates. In fact, the disruption has 
been so significant with respect to the ability of songwriters and artists 
to collect royalties that there has been a bipartisan effort in Congress 
over the past few years to address their concerns.21 Those years of 
advocacy culminated on October 11, 2018, when President Trump 
signed the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) into law.22 The MMA 
“is designed to streamline the music licensing process to make it 
easier for rights holders to get paid when their music is streamed 
online.”23 The most significant change made by the MMA was the 
creation of a new governing agency that “would issue blanket 
mechanical licenses to digital services, and collect and distribute 
royalties to rights holders.”24 The effect of this measure would be to 
ensure that artists, songwriters, and other rights holders are paid on 
time and what they are owed.25 Assuming it functions as intended, the 
MMA represents a huge victory for rights holders like artists and 
songwriters.  
In regard to consent decrees between the DOJ and PROs like 
BMI, the MMA changed the way judges are assigned to hear 
performance-royalty rate proceedings by making the assignments 
random.26 The MMA, however, did not override most aspects of the 
consent decree between the DOJ and BMI.27 In changing the way 
judges are selected to oversee proceedings relating to a consent 
decree, the MMA seems to be adjusting the way disputes will be 
adjudicated between the parties to the consent decree but not 
addressing many of the underlying causes of controversy. The MMA 
will hopefully make the process of royalty collection smoother for 
rights holders, but many of the disputes that exist between the PROs 
and the DOJ relating to their consent decrees are still in play. 
 
 21. Dani Deahl, The Music Modernization Act Has Been Signed into Law, VERGE 
(Oct. 11, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/11/17963804/music-
modernization-act-mma-copyright-law-bill-labels-congress [https://perma.cc/T6BX-SUX4]. 
 22. See Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 23. Micah Singleton, Congress May Actually Fix Music Royalties: The Music 
Modernization Act, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/
26/16931966/congress-music-modernization-act-licensing-royalties [https://perma.cc/Q9FL-
8NEW]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Rachel Kim, 6 Things To Know About the Music Modernization Act, S. 2823, 
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (May 10, 2018), https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_post/6-things-to-
know-about-the-music-modernization-act-s2823/ [https://perma.cc/3AVK-ZV9W].  
 27. Id. 
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Therefore, the discussion of consent decree modification in this area 
remains relevant. 
At the time of the consent decree’s creation in 1966, or even at 
the time of its amendment in 1994, the DOJ could not have 
envisioned the development of digital technologies, such as Spotify, 
Pandora, and Apple Music. Such significant changes in technology 
have raised questions over the propriety of allowing an industry to be 
regulated by an antitrust consent decree that was created at a time 
when the industry it regulates was almost unrecognizable.28 
Based on these concerns, BMI sought to modify the consent 
decree in 2014 but was blocked by the DOJ.29 Instead, the DOJ 
sought to reinterpret the consent decree in 2016 to change the way 
performance rights licensing operates by requiring the adoption of 
“full-work” licensing in place of the traditional practice of 
“fractional” licensing.30 If such a change were to be implemented, it 
would represent a seismic shift in the performance rights licensing 
industry that would lead to severe administrative, financial, and 
creative impacts for PROs and songwriters.31 After the DOJ 
announced its reinterpretation, BMI sought a declaratory judgment in 
federal district court that the consent decree does not require full-
work licensing.32 The district court held in United States v. Broadcast 
 
 28. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 318 (“While the music business is no stranger to 
disruptive innovation (e.g., Napster), for the first time in decades judicial action seems to 
be the culprit of the disruption rather than the commercial innovation itself. The 
commercial innovation in question: music streaming; the judicial (in)action: failure to 
update consent decrees.”); Konczal, supra note 17, at 132 (“A defendant often requests a 
modification because of technological innovations, industrial changes, or increases in 
competition since the entry of the decree that have made compliance with the decree too 
burdensome and restrictive. The Antitrust Division often requests a modification because 
of a change in circumstances in the industry or business affected by the decree to the 
extent that the decree no longer serves the purposes of the antitrust laws.”). 
 29. See ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, FUTURE MUSIC COALITION (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/
YJ6Y-NP8Z]. 
 30. See Conte, supra note 10, at 324 (“Drawing from this default position of copyright 
law, it follows that when one of multiple copyright owners of a single musical composition 
wants to permit a music user to play that composition publicly, that owner alone may give 
license. This process is known as full-work licensing.”); see also David J. Kappos, The 
Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 665, 683 (2018) 
(“Ignoring this longstanding consensus, in 2016 the DOJ began contending that a PRO 
should be able to license only works to which it can offer a complete license, in other 
words, works created entirely by parties who are members of that PRO.”). 
 31. See Conte, supra note 10, at 334. For additional discussion of the implications of 
shifting from fractional licensing to full-work licensing, see infra Part IV. 
 32. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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Music, Inc.,33 and the Second Circuit later affirmed, that the consent 
decree requires neither fractional nor full-work licensing, so either 
form of licensing would be permissible.34 As a result, there was no 
clear resolution to the dispute over licensing practices. Although the 
DOJ “lost” in Broadcast Music, Inc. and BMI “won,” the practical 
consequence of the ordeal is that the outdated terms of the consent 
decree still remain the same almost five years after BMI requested a 
modification. From a normative standpoint, it seems problematic that 
major players in a rapidly changing industry have been requesting 
modification for almost five years without any success. 
When viewed through that prism, everyone loses. When external 
forces demand changes in terms that cannot be effectuated, the 
industry as a whole becomes less efficient. If the performance rights 
licensing industry is not operating at an optimal level because it is 
governed by outdated consent decrees, then there are harmful 
consequences to PROs, songwriters, publishers, bar and restaurant 
owners, the DOJ, other music consumers, and the economy as a 
whole due to persistent inefficiencies that could be avoided by 
modifying the terms of the consent decree. As Thomas Jefferson once 
wrote in a letter to James Madison, “[T]he earth belongs in usufruct 
to the living,”35 and that sentiment still rings true several hundred 
years later. Intuitively, it does not make sense for the performance 
rights licensing industry—or any other industry for that matter—to be 
governed by terms that were created in a previous generation. In 
some ways, Jefferson’s statement rings even more true today in a 
world in which technologies like music streaming are advancing at a 
pace that has never been seen before. This Recent Development 
argues that the current precedent governing modification of consent 
decrees, which is characterized by inflexibility, is suboptimal for 
society because it hinders the timely adoption of important changes to 
consent decrees that are necessary for industries to keep pace with 
emerging technologies like music streaming. In response, the legal 
process of consent decree modification should be relaxed through the 
adoption of a new totality-of-the-circumstances test. 
 
 33. 207 F. Supp. 3d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 34. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 
1958) (“The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems 
never to have been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of 
such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental 
principles of every government.”).  
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This Recent Development proceeds in five parts. Part I explores 
the historical background of consent decrees and their role in 
antitrust regulation of the performance rights licensing industry. Part 
II examines the facts and holding of Broadcast Music, Inc. Part III 
surveys the current law with respect to modification and asserts that 
consent decrees should be modified, not reinterpreted. Part IV 
illustrates why it is crucial for the terms of the BMI consent decree to 
be changed by exploring the desired modifications of involved parties 
in response to the ever-changing technological climate. Finally, Part V 
proposes that courts adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances test for 
assessing modification requests in order to make it easier to modify 
consent decrees while still maintaining necessary safeguards against 
ill-advised or unfair changes. Adopting the new totality-of-the-
circumstances test would make consent decree modifications more 
attainable and would thereby enable performance rights licensing and 
other industries to adapt to changes in technology and society in a 
more timely manner. 
I.  ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES AND THEIR ROLE IN MUSIC 
LICENSING 
Since the early 1940s, consent decrees have played a powerful 
role in the regulation of performance rights licensing by PROs such as 
BMI and ASCAP.36 As a result, music publishers and PROs have had 
a disproportionate amount of power in the industry for over seven 
decades.37 For instance, ASCAP controlled “the great bulk of music 
in commercial demand” during the first half of the twentieth century, 
which led to widespread fears that it could hold monopolistic power 
over performance rights licensing.38 In 1939, BMI was created as an 
alternative to ASCAP in an effort to break up ASCAP’s monopoly.39 
The introduction of BMI, however, did not immediately solve the 
problem and, in 1941, the DOJ took action to curb perceived antitrust 
abuses by suing ASCAP for antitrust violations and market abuse.40 
The parties settled the lawsuit via a consent decree and, shortly 
thereafter, BMI also entered into a consent decree with the DOJ with 
nearly identical terms.41 These settlements set the precedent for using 
 
 36. See ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Comment, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable 
Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. 258, 260. 
 39. See Conte, supra note 10, at 336. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 334. 
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consent decrees as a tool for antitrust regulation in performance 
rights licensing. 
Essentially, a consent decree is a contract between parties in 
litigation. The court enters the decree as a judgment in order to settle 
a lawsuit on terms that are, in theory, mutually acceptable to all 
litigants.42 In the context of performance rights licensing, consent 
decrees are used for antitrust regulation and occur between the DOJ 
and a corporate defendant.43 Antitrust consent decrees have also been 
used by the DOJ in the context of cellular communication.44 
A consent decree in the antitrust context is an agreement 
between the government and a defendant that settles a pending 
antitrust action that has typically been brought by the DOJ.45 By 
entering into a consent decree, the defendant “accepts specific 
limitations on his future conduct, and the Government indicates its 
willingness to terminate the suit on those terms.”46 A consent decree 
entered by a district does not constitute an adjudication on the 
merits.47 As a result, the government exercises a measure of control 
over the defendant because the defendant must, moving forward, 
abide by the terms set by the government in the consent decree.48 The 
use of consent decrees to settle cases has benefits for both sides, not 
the least of which is the avoidance of lengthy and costly litigation.49 
In addition, consent decrees are used as a regulatory tool in a 
number of other contexts. For instance, the Environmental Protection 
Agency has used consent decrees to mandate guidelines for entities 
involved in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.50 Consent decrees 
have also been used in the context of employment and civil rights 
issues, such as use by a court to settle a civil rights lawsuit brought by 
an Alabama man alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.51 
 
 42. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40. 
 43. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188−89. 
 44. See Bernard T. Shen, Comment, From Jail Cell to Cellular Communication: 
Should the Rufo Standard Be Applied to Antitrust and Commercial Consent Decrees?, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1781, 1782−83 (1996). 
 45. See Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1303, 1303 (1967).  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 1304−05. 
 50. See John R. Thomas, Note, United States v. Fisher: “Posner’s Dilemma” and the 
Uncertain Triumph of Outcome over Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 427, 427 (1991). 
 51. Michael T. Larkin, Casenotes, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1063, 1064 (1990). 
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Moreover, consent decrees have been used in lawsuits by 
prisoners complaining of inhumane conditions inside prisons.52 For 
example, before a lawsuit between the inmates and administrators of 
a prison in the U.S. Virgin Islands reached trial, it was settled via a 
consent decree that represented a compromise between the prison 
and the inmates.53 The resulting consent decree did not close the 
facility as the inmates requested, but it did contain a number of new 
regulations that were favorable to the inmates.54 For instance, it 
required the prison to reduce the inmate population to ninety-seven 
and improve the prison’s shelter, health care, and fire safety.55 
A. The Function of Consent Decrees in Antitrust Regulation 
One of the main objectives behind the consent decree regime in 
antitrust regulation is efficiency. Consent decrees eliminate the time 
and expense involved in preparing for and fully litigating a dispute.56 
In order to capture this efficiency, the parties generally agree upon 
consent decrees at a relatively early stage in the litigation.57 Consent 
decrees tend to reflect a degree of compromise because the 
agreements usually emerge from a series of secret, informal 
negotiations between counsel from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and 
the defendant’s lawyers.58  
Under the current regime, parties also benefit from using consent 
decrees to find common ground in disputes. Rather than allowing the 
litigation to continue as a zero-sum game in which one party will win 
and the other party will lose, consent decrees allow parties to come 
together and broker the most efficient, fair, and sustainable solution 
possible. 
 
 52. See, e.g., Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. V.I. 1997); see also Deborah 
Decker, Comment, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 
Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-Management?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
1275, 1276−78 (“In June 1994, a group of pretrial detainees and inmates at the Criminal 
Justice Complex in St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, brought a class action 
requesting that the complex be closed because of extreme overcrowding and related 
health concerns.”). 
 53. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278. 
 54. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732–33; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278. 
 55. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732–33, 732 n.4; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278 
(requiring that “the inmate population [be reduced] to ninety-seven and requir[ing] the 
defendants to make improvements in a number of areas, including shelter, mental health 
care, medical care, fire safety, and security”). 
 56. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
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Consent decrees play an important role in antitrust regulation 
because their terms serve as rules for how defendant-corporations 
may behave in the future and gives the DOJ recourse if the 
corporations violate those rules. For instance, the ASCAP and BMI 
consent decrees created a separate Rate Court for ASCAP and BMI, 
which is used to adjudicate disputes between a PRO and a music user 
to determine reasonable license fees.59 This independent decision-
making body serves to protect consumer interests because it 
safeguards against ASCAP and BMI using their near monopoly in the 
market to charge exorbitant prices.60 Additionally, the ASCAP and 
BMI consent decrees regulate the two dominant PROs by stipulating 
that agreements between composers and ASCAP or BMI are 
nonexclusive, meaning that composers remain free to directly license 
their works to a music user outside the PRO structure even if the 
composers are already members of ASCAP or BMI.61 This term of 
the consent decree limits the power and influence of ASCAP and 
BMI while fostering expansion in the marketplace by keeping the 
door open for smaller competitors to enter the fray. 
As a practical matter, the defendant in litigation against the 
DOJ, which is typically a corporation or other institution, has the 
burden of initiating negotiations and preparing a first draft of the 
consent decree.62 After the defendant has submitted a draft proposal 
for the terms of the consent decree, lawyers on both sides begin secret 
negotiations in pursuit of a final agreement that is acceptable to all 
parties.63 
After negotiations finish, a court must accept and sign the 
proposed consent decree.64 Court approval, however, is typically little 
more than a formality and is generally regarded as a routine matter.65 
The court is not required to make any findings of fact or conclusions 
of law in approving a consent decree.66 Rather, counsel for each party 
gives a short presentation and, if the court is satisfied that the parties 
 
 59. See Todd Brabec, The Performance Right—A World in Transition, 42 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV. 16, 18−19 (2016). 
 60. Id. at 20–21. 
 61. See id. at 22. 
 62. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40. 
 63. See id. at 41. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. United States v. Inst. of Carpet Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 1 F.R.D. 636, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941). 
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are in agreement, it enters the consent decree with only a cursory 
review.67 
B. The Importance of Consent Decree Changes for PROs: The 
Collection of Royalties 
The antitrust consent decree at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc. 
represents a voluntary agreement between BMI and the U.S. 
government containing the rules under which BMI must conduct its 
business.68 Among other things, the consent decree “[g]overns BMI’s 
obligations to its license customers; [s]ets the rules for BMI’s 
relationships with its songwriters, [c]omposers and publishers; and 
[c]reates a ‘rate court’ where BMI and its customers can resolve 
disputes regarding the rates and terms of their license agreement.”69 
The consent decree was intended to promote competition in the 
marketplace for musical works by encouraging ASCAP and BMI to 
compete with one another to attract licensees and recruit new 
songwriter- and publisher-members.70 The BMI consent decree has 
become controversial because most of its terms were drafted in 1966 
at a time when technologies relating to the distribution and sharing of 
music were essentially unrecognizable. BMI now believes that “[t]he 
decree is simply not built to address the specific challenges and 
opportunities of the current music rights marketplace.”71 
The proposed changes to BMI’s consent decree are important on 
a day-to-day basis because they govern the collection of royalties.72 
Traditionally, PROs operate as agents for composers and songwriters 
who own the copyrights to their songs but are not well versed in 
licensing. PROs serve as middlemen and help composers license the 
performance rights to their songs to music users who want to perform 
those songs without violating copyright law.73 First, a publisher signs a 
 
 67. Phillips, supra note 17, at 41. 
 68. For an overview of the history of the consent decree between the DOJ and BMI, 
see Gagliano, supra note 8, at 323−29; Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its Jail Cell: 
The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County 
Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 662 (1997) (“Over the past thirty years, antitrust enforcement 
agencies have fervently embraced the consent decree as a tonic for much of what ails a 
competitive marketplace.”). 
 69. What Is the Consent Decree?, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., https://www.bmi.com/
pdfs/advocacy/about_bmi_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/95QK-P7UZ]. 
 70. ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29. 
 71. What Is the Consent Decree?, supra note 69. 
 72. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 319. 
 73. See Brabec, supra note 59, at 17−18. 
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contract with a PRO.74 Then, the PRO issues licenses to music users 
who, in turn, receive the right to play or perform all of the songs 
controlled by all of the songwriters.75 In effect, the PROs create 
efficiency by pooling copyrights and issuing collective licenses to 
music users and then paying their affiliated member-publishers pro-
rated shares of the net income.76 
C. The Problem of Fractional Licensing 
The traditional industry practice is fractional licensing of jointly 
owned songs.77 This fractional-licensing regime took hold out of 
necessity in America during the twentieth century based on the 
administrative infeasibility of monitoring every single live 
performance of every song.78 Essentially, fractional licensing occurs 
when a PRO licenses only the share of a co-owned work that is owned 
by the composer who is a member of the PRO.79 Many, if not most, 
songs are co-owned by multiple individuals, such as a composer, a 
lyricist, and a producer. Under a fractional-licensing regime, each co-
owner of a song can only license, whether directly or through a PRO, 
his proportional interest in the co-owned song to other music users.80 
Thus, it follows that if the co-owners of a song belong to different 
PROs, each PRO may only license the fraction of the work that 
belongs to the co-owner who is a member of that PRO.81 To ensure 
they are covered under this fractional-licensing system, music users 
like performance venues generally purchase licenses from all four of 
the major PROs because all co-owners will almost certainly be a 
member of one of the prominent PROs.82 
 
 74. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 
242 (Simon & Schuster, 9th ed. 2015). 
 75. Id.  
 76. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 319−20. 
 77. Letter from Stuart Rosen, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, BMI, to Chief 
of the Litig. Section of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 20, 2015) 
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in regard to the “Justice Department Review of the BMI and ASCAP Consent Decrees” 
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 78. See Music Licensing History, NAT’L RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING MUSIC LICENSE 
COMMITTEE, http://www.nrbmlc.com/music-licensing/music-licensing-history/ [https://perma.cc/
HYW7-CHEX]. 
 79. See Kappos, supra note 30, at 682. 
 80. See id. at 683. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id.; see also Ely, supra note 1, at 49 (“Under the current system, if a business 
or organization wishes to publicly perform music, it must obtain licenses from ASCAP, 
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For example, suppose A and B are co-owners of a song, with 
each of them owning 50% of the copyright per an agreement between 
them. If A is a member of ASCAP, then ASCAP will issue licenses to 
music users like restaurants and then pay A royalties in the amount of 
his fractional share, which is 50% in this case. Likewise, if B is a 
member of BMI, then BMI will issue licenses to music users and then 
pay B royalties in the amount of his 50% fractional share. If a music 
user has purchased licenses from both ASCAP and BMI, then it 
operates under the assumption that it may legally play 100% of the 
work rather than worrying about fractional shares of co-owners. If a 
music user has purchased licenses from both ASCAP and BMI, then 
it does not have to worry about liability relating to unauthorized 
performance of the work. 
As a result, the fractional-licensing regime simplifies the 
administration of performance rights licensing by not forcing all 
involved parties to keep careful track of precise percentages in co-
ownership agreements. As a technical matter, the PROs only have the 
right to license the percentage of a composition owned by their 
affiliates. As a practical matter, however, they can license the entire 
song because the presence of only four main PROs allows music users 
to cover their bases fairly easily by simply purchasing a license from 
all four. This ambiguity that music users face in determining whether 
they have properly licensed an entire song, in part, led to the DOJ’s 
challenge of the fractional-licensing regime, despite its long-running 
position as the default industry practice.83 
The fractional-licensing system also becomes complicated in the 
context of royalties, as PROs only collect royalties for their own 
affiliates and in proportion to their ownership interests in the songs.84 
If a song is co-owned by multiple owners who work with different 
PROs, then each PRO has to independently collect royalties and pay 
them out to members based on the proportion of the song owned by 
the member.85 
Despite the prevalence of multiple co-owners having fractional 
ownership interests and often working with different PROs, music 
users can assume they are properly licensed to perform any song, as 
long as they have licenses with the four main PROs.86 In this way, 
 
BMI, or SESAC; or it could also buy licenses from a combination of two or all three of 
these performance rights organizations.”). 
 83. See Ely, supra note 1, at 49. 
 84. See id. at 50. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 49. 
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fractional licensing creates antitrust concerns due to the potential for 
stifling competition by crowding the market. It is feasible for a bar or 
restaurant to purchase licenses with only four PROs, which is all that 
is needed to be in compliance under the current fractional-licensing 
regime. On the other hand, it would not be feasible for every bar and 
restaurant to purchase licenses from dozens of PROs in order to 
avoid liability, which might be necessary in a more competitive 
market under a fractional-licensing regime. 
As such, it would be extremely difficult for competitor PROs to 
break into the market under a fractional-licensing scheme because 
music users do not want to be required to purchase more licenses in 
order to be in compliance. Therefore, the fractional-licensing system 
reinforces the dominance of only four PROs in the market because it 
would be difficult for competitors to even enter the market. If the 
long-standing practice of fractional licensing seems a bit unclear, that 
is because it is unclear.87 
D. The Push for Full-Work Licensing  
In recent years, the DOJ has targeted fractional licensing, at least 
in part because of the ambiguities surrounding co-ownership interests 
and has sought to replace it by reinterpreting performance rights 
licensing consent decrees to require a full-work licensing regime as it 
did in Broadcast Music, Inc.88 A full-work licensing system would be 
entirely different from the current fractional-licensing regime. Such a 
massive shift would force the industry to completely change how it 
transacts business in many ways.89 Under a full-work licensing regime, 
PROs would have “to grant a complete 100% license for any song 
they administer, even if only a portion.”90 The administrability of this 
system grows murky in the context of royalties because BMI would 
have to grant a 100% license to music users even if its member only 
owned 50% of the song and his co-owner owned the other 50% but 
was affiliated with ASCAP.91 
In effect, the PRO would have to grant 100% of the license and 
then pay applicable royalties to both its member and the member of 
 
 87. See id. (“[T]he exact mechanics of what songs (or portions of songs) each of these 
licenses cover seem to be unclear.”). 
 88. See id. (“The ambiguous nature of these licenses is evidenced by the questions 
posed by the Department of Justice.”). 
 89. See id. at 50 (“This new regime would be completely at odds with the current 
music licensing system, and would undermine decades of established and efficient 
practices.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
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another PRO in proportion to their co-ownership interests. That 
would be a significant change because, under the current fractional-
licensing regime, “PROs account only to their own affiliates.”92 Under 
a full-work licensing regime, PROs would have to implement a system 
to track nonaffiliate composers in order to pay them the royalties they 
are owed.93 Gathering all of that information about nonmembers 
would be costly and complicated and would result in higher 
transaction costs for both affiliates of PROs and music users.94 
Such a radical departure from the traditional practice of 
fractional licensing would turn the industry on its head by forcing all 
interested parties to revisit and reformulate decades of established 
practices that have grown out of practical experience in the field.95 In 
many ways, parties involved in licensing would have to start over with 
regard to their licensing practices and would lose the efficiencies and 
institutional knowledge they have developed over the past century. 
Unsurprisingly, there was significant backlash against the DOJ’s 
reinterpretation, and it was challenged by BMI in federal court.96 
II.  FACTS OF BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
OPINION 
Due to the advent of streaming technologies, in 2014 BMI 
petitioned the DOJ to modify the consent decree “to permit 
publishers to directly negotiate streaming rights with digital services 
providers like Spotify and Pandora.”97 The DOJ opened a review of 
BMI’s consent decree in response.98 On August 4, 2016, the DOJ 
announced that it would not modify the consent decree but instead 
would reinterpret the decree to include a 100% full-work licensing 
requirement.99 The DOJ, in issuing this reinterpretation, turned the 
traditional model of fractional licensing on its head. The DOJ’s new 
requirement of full-work licensing would mean that BMI must 
“license 100% of a song for use, regardless of what percentage of the 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017) (striking down the DOJ’s reinterpretation of the 
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 98. See id. 
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song [BMI] represents.”100 Therefore, “any entity that controls part of 
a composition must offer a license for the whole of the 
composition.”101 The DOJ based its decision not only on textual 
interpretations of the consent decree but also on the policy reason 
that “only full-work licensing can yield the substantial procompetitive 
benefits associated with blanket licenses.”102 
This reinterpretation would have been significant because, as 
described above, the performance rights licensing industry has 
traditionally operated under a fractional-licensing regime “whereby 
each owner holds a copyright to a portion of the song, and all must 
grant license[s] to a music user in order to secure the rights to a public 
performance.”103 
In an effort to preserve the status quo of fractional licensing and 
avoid upsetting the apple cart for the entire performance rights 
licensing industry, BMI promptly challenged the DOJ’s decision in 
district court and won.104 In striking down the DOJ’s reinterpretation 
of the consent decree, Judge Louis L. Stanton wrote that “[t]he 
Consent Decree neither bars fractional licensing, nor requires full-
work licensing.”105 The DOJ appealed the district court’s ruling to the 
Second Circuit.106  
In United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,107 the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court and rejected the DOJ’s proposed 
reinterpretation that would have required full-work licensing.108 The 
Second Circuit held that, in asking for its proposed reinterpretation, 
the DOJ was in effect asking the court to read an additional 
requirement into the consent decree in order to accomplish 
procompetitive objectives.109 The court concluded that it would be 
 
 100. Brittany Hodak, U.S. Dept. of Justice Deals Crushing Blow to Songwriters, 
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 101. ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29. 
 102. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE 
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 103. Conte, supra note 10, at 324.  
 104. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 105. See id. at 377. 
 106. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 14 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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 108. Id. at 18.  
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decree to advance these procompetitive objectives, we are foreclosed from doing so.”). 
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improper to consider the potential competitive impact of the 
proposed reinterpretation and thus rejected the reinterpretation 
because it was not supported by the terms contained within the four 
corners of the consent decree.110 In doing so, the Second Circuit 
squashed the DOJ’s attempt to make a significant material change to 
the operation of the consent decree through reinterpretation rather 
than an actual modification of the terms. 
In a technical sense, the Second Circuit appropriately applied 
existing precedent governing the interpretation of consent decrees. 
Over the years, there have been a number of decisions in which courts 
commented on the process of interpreting consent decrees. In Perez 
v. Danbury Hospital,111 the Second Circuit stated that it is a “well-
established principle that the language of a consent decree must 
dictate what a party is required to do and what it must refrain from 
doing” and that “courts must abide by the express terms of a consent 
decree and may not impose [additional requirements or] 
supplementary obligations on the parties even to fulfill the purposes 
of the decree more effectively.”112 In addition, in United States v. 
Armour & Co.113 the Supreme Court stated that “the scope of a 
consent decree must be discerned within its four corners.”114 The 
Court may not “impose obligations on a party that are not 
unambiguously mandated by the decree itself.”115 These rigid 
principles limit the ability of courts to approve any reinterpretation 
beyond the express terms of a consent decree. 
On a textual basis, the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. properly 
adhered to precedent because the text of the consent decree is silent 
on the issue of fractional versus full-work licensing,116 and precedent 
precludes the court from imposing any requirements upon parties not 
expressly included in the terms of the consent decree.117 In its 
argument, the DOJ claimed that a full-work licensing arrangement 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. 347 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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would have “procompetitive benefits.”118 However, the court did not 
take a deep look at the policy reasons behind the proposed 
reinterpretation because Perez stated that it could not impose 
additional requirements that were not already included in the text of 
the consent decree, even when they might “fulfill the purposes of the 
decree more effectively.”119 In that sense, Perez stands for the 
proposition that courts cannot interpret consent decrees based on 
policy reasons without an explicit basis in the text of the agreement. 
Decisions relating to reinterpretation and modification of 
antitrust consent decrees are high stakes, and any such changes have 
the potential to cause reverberations throughout the entire 
industry.120 Following the court’s decision in Broadcast Music, Inc., 
the MIC Coalition (“MIC”)—a group of trade associations that 
represent radio stations and other music users—released a statement 
saying the decision “will have devastating consequences for the future 
of music licensing. If left unchallenged, this decision will 
fundamentally alter decades of business practices while destroying the 
value of collective licensing and threatening to throw the entire music 
marketplace into chaos.”121 The dramatic prose and “sky-is-falling” 
tone of MIC’s statement shows how crucial the terms of these consent 
decrees are to parties with material interests in the performance 
rights licensing industry. 
Although the DOJ “lost” in Broadcast Music, Inc. and BMI 
“won,” the practical consequence of the litigation is that the outdated 
terms of the consent decree still remain the same almost five years 
after BMI requested a modification. After the initial modification 
request, the DOJ was able to reject the request and instead announce 
its own unilateral reinterpretation that would have the practical effect 
of a modification.122 Under the current system, BMI’s only recourse 
against the DOJ’s reinterpretation was to challenge it in federal 
district court. Then, once the district court rejected the 
reinterpretation, the dispute entered the lengthy appeals process.123 
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Given how cumbersome and slow the American courts system 
typically is, it is unsurprising that the terms of the BMI consent decree 
remain the same. From a normative standpoint, it seems problematic 
that major players in a rapidly changing industry have been 
requesting modification for almost five years without any success. 
The DOJ and other proponents of full-work licensing view 
fractional licensing as anticompetitive, forcing music users to 
purchase licenses from all four major PROs in order to avoid 
liability.124 Implementing a system in which music users are not 
required to have licenses with all PROs in order to protect themselves 
would allow for competition to enter the market and for the number 
of PROs to expand, thus driving down prices. In a fractional-licensing 
system in which all music users must purchase licenses with PROs, it 
is going to be difficult for new PROs to gain traction because music 
users want to purchase as few licenses as possible. 
The full-work licensing system would also help music users 
ensure they are in compliance with copyright law by relieving the 
clerical burden of keeping track of co-ownership interests.125 There is 
no central database that keeps track of co-ownership interests in 
songs, so it is difficult for music users to ensure compliance with 
copyright law because they do not know with certainty who owns or 
co-owns compositions and in what proportion.126 In a full-work 
licensing regime, music users would have assurance that they can 
legally perform specific compositions, as any PRO that owned any 
portion of a song would have the authority to grant a full license to 
perform the composition.127 
In sum, the Second Circuit’s holding was correct as a technical 
matter because the court properly adhered to applicable precedent in 
its decision. Common sense tells us that outdated consent decrees 
need to be updated to keep pace with emerging technologies, but 
existing precedent indicates that reinterpretation is not an effective 
method for changing consent decrees. Therefore, it is important to 
explore other possible avenues for changing consent decrees. 
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III.  CHANGING A CONSENT DECREE THROUGH MODIFICATION 
RATHER THAN REINTERPRETATION 
A. Reinterpretation as a Method for Altering Consent Decrees 
While the court’s rejection of the DOJ’s proposed 
reinterpretation was correct in a technical sense, the result also seems 
proper in a normative sense. The Second Circuit’s rejection of the 
DOJ’s reinterpretation of the existing terms is intuitive because it 
seems that the DOJ may have been trying to obtain its desired 
reforms by using reinterpretation as a back door. It can be termed a 
“back door” because the DOJ’s maneuvering sought to materially 
change the terms of the consent decree without actually changing the 
terms. If the main objective behind consent decrees is to reach 
compromise through voluntary negotiations, then it makes sense that 
one party should not be able to unilaterally reinterpret the previously 
agreed upon terms in a way that materially changes the operation of a 
bilaterally created agreement. 
Scholars have argued that, if reinterpretation of consent decrees 
becomes common, then the incentive to enter into such decrees would 
be reduced significantly because they would seem like a thing of wax 
in the hands of agencies.128 If agencies could easily change consent 
decrees through reinterpretation, then the terms of decrees would 
become unpredictable and it would be harder for parties to rely on 
them in making organizational decisions.129 Predictability is an 
important attribute of consent decrees that should be preserved, as it 
is part of what makes consent decrees attractive as a means of dispute 
resolution in the first place.130 If consent decrees were to disappear as 
a regulatory tool, then litigation would increase significantly and be 
costly and burdensome to all parties involved.131 
Some might argue that agencies have expertise in the field and 
should be able to change the terms of consent decrees in accordance 
with that expertise. The dispute surrounding Broadcast Music, Inc., 
however, reveals that material changes to these consent decrees can 
have reverberations that echo throughout an entire industry and, 
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when aggregated, the economy as a whole.132 In addition, often a 
change that is beneficial for one side is harmful for the other. As a 
result, one must ask whether, as a normative matter, it is acceptable 
for a few experts at an agency to be making decisions that could have 
such a profound impact on many different elements of the economy 
and society without the participation of the interested parties and the 
courts. 
In this case, the DOJ wanted to change the system to full-work 
licensing in order to achieve procompetitive benefits. Such a change 
would result in a massive shift for the performance rights licensing 
industry. For the reasons discussed above, unilateral reinterpretation 
by one party should not be the manner by which consent decrees 
change because reinterpretation of material terms could 
fundamentally alter the way an entire industry does business and, in 
turn, have a noticeable effect on the overall economy. Although the 
actual language of a consent decree would not be changed through 
reinterpretation, its operation could be significantly altered, as 
evidenced by the Broadcast Music, Inc. dispute. Therefore, the rigid 
precedent relating to reinterpretation of consent decrees is tolerable 
for society because one party should not be able to change the 
operation of the decree. 
Having exposed the weaknesses of reinterpretation, another 
method is needed to facilitate changes to consent decrees when 
necessary in order to keep pace with new technologies. These 
antitrust consent decrees do not, as a practical matter, exist in a 
vacuum. While the terms of consent decrees remain static over the 
years, forces in technology and society are constantly evolving. As 
technology advances, the ecosystem in which consent decrees operate 
can completely change and render obsolete the ability of the consent 
decree to effectively regulate. In terms of the BMI consent decree, 
the advent of digital music has essentially ushered in a new epoch of 
performance rights licensing. It is troubling, to say the least, that a 
consent decree originally drafted in 1966 and last amended in 1994 
still governs performance rights licensing in the digital age. Since the 
early days of antitrust consent decrees, scholars have shared these 
concerns about the ability, or lack thereof, to update consent decrees 
in response to changing circumstances in technology and society.133 
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B. Case Law Relating to Modification of Consent Decrees 
With reinterpretation off the table, modification is another 
avenue through which a party may seek to change the terms of a 
consent decree. First, the party seeking modification must make a 
motion requesting that the court amend an antitrust consent decree.134 
In its 1932 opinion in United States v. Swift & Co.,135 the Court stated 
that, in order to succeed, the movant must show that new 
circumstances have led to a “grievous wrong” that requires a 
modification to the agreement.136 Years later, in United States v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,137 the Court added that a request for 
modification should only be granted if the movant can show that the 
decree’s original purposes have been fulfilled.138 That holding could 
apply in the context of the BMI consent decree if hundreds of PROs 
suddenly appeared and BMI no longer had a near monopoly on the 
licensing of performance rights. The original purpose of the consent 
decree between the DOJ and BMI was to limit anticompetitive 
behavior and alleviate antitrust concerns in a performance rights 
licensing industry that was, at that time, dominated by only a few 
PROs.139 If, hypothetically, hundreds of new PROs entered the 
performance rights licensing industry and BMI only possessed a two 
percent market share, then a court might say that the decree’s original 
purpose has been fulfilled and, in turn, would likely be willing to 
grant a modification. Swift and United Shoe have together been 
construed to form the fairly rigid, traditional standard for modifying 
an antitrust consent decree.140 
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modifying or revoking the decree in accordance with the reservation of power”). 
 134. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 132 (“The court that initially enters a consent 
decree has the power to modify the decree. .	.	. Despite this inherent power of a court of 
equity, most consent decrees contain a retention-of-jurisdiction clause which stipulates 
that the court entering the decree can later modify or terminate it at the request of one or 
both of the parties.”). 
 135. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
 136. Id. at 119 (“Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new 
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed .	.	. with the consent 
of all concerned.”). 
 137. 391 U.S. 244 (1968). 
 138. See id. at 248 (noting that a request for modification should not be granted where 
the “purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree .	.	. have not been fully 
achieved”). 
 139. See supra notes 9−18 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 625−26. 
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However, the precedent set forth by Swift and United Shoe—
both antitrust cases—became murky after the Court relaxed the 
standard in the context of institutional reform (notably separate from 
the area of antitrust).141 In the institutional reform setting, consent 
decrees have been used to regulate institutions by imposing 
requirements on their administration. For instance, a consent decree 
could force a prison to improve living conditions for inmates by 
instituting a strict cap on the number of inmates who could be housed 
there, limiting the number of inmates per cell, or requiring that 
inmates be given a certain amount of time outdoors each day. 
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,142 the Court said the 
movant need only show that a “significant change in circumstances 
warrants revision of the decree.”143 The Rufo Court held that consent 
decrees may be amended “when changed factual conditions make 
compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,” “when a 
decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or 
“when enforcement of the decree without modification would be 
detrimental to the public interest.”144 This new standard set forth a 
much lower bar for modifying a consent decree than the rigid test set 
forth in Swift and United Shoe. As a result, Rufo stands for a more 
flexible approach to amending consent decrees. It is unclear, 
however, whether the Rufo standard would apply to an antitrust 
consent decree as in Broadcast Music, Inc. because Rufo involved an 
institutional reform consent decree.145 
In 1995, the Second Circuit appeared to extend the more flexible 
Rufo standard to the modification of antitrust consent decrees in 
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.146 In Kodak, a photographic film 
company entered into two separate antitrust consent decrees with the 
DOJ in 1921 and 1954 that imposed a variety of restrictions on 
Kodak’s business practices.147 In 1993, Kodak brought a motion to 
modify or terminate the consent decrees.148 The district court and the 
 
 141. See generally Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (adopting 
the more flexible Rufo standard for modification requests of consent decrees in the 
context of institutional reform). 
 142. 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
 143. Id. at 383. 
 144. Id. at 384. 
 145. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 626 (“Because the consent decree in Rufo 
specifically involved institutional reform, lower courts are divided over the extent to which 
Rufo’s more flexible standard should apply beyond an institutional reform setting.”). 
 146. 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 147. Id. at 97. 
 148. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), 
aff’d, 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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Second Circuit first agreed that the Supreme Court’s rulings in United 
Shoe and Rufo provided the legal standard for terminating antitrust 
consent decrees, and second, under the standards announced in those 
decisions, it was proper to terminate or modify the consent decrees.149 
Despite the court’s explicit application of Rufo, the court 
stopped short of wholesale importation of the Rufo standard into 
antitrust consent decree jurisprudence.150 In effect, the Second 
Circuit’s apparent adoption of Rufo into the context of antitrust 
consent decree modification amounted to nothing more than a Swift 
and United Shoe analysis.151 As a result, there is substantial confusion 
as to whether the Second Circuit should apply Rufo in the case of an 
antitrust consent decree modification.152 
Under the somewhat confusing law of modification, BMI has 
experienced years of delay in securing potential changes to the decree 
that could improve the way the entire industry operates. BMI first 
tried to modify the consent decree in 2014 in response to the advent 
of streaming technologies like Spotify and Pandora and now, almost 
five years later, the consent decree with the DOJ remains in place and 
unchanged.153 With an eye to the almost five-year delay, the proof is 
in the pudding that modification precedent is too rigid and needs to 
be loosened to make it easier to update terms of consent decrees. 
If a party to a consent decree—especially if that party is a major 
player in a multibillion-dollar industry, like BMI—sees the need to 
change the terms of that decree in order to optimize its business in 
response to new technologies such as music streaming, then there 
needs to be a way for that potential modification to be explored more 
efficiently. In addition, the modification process must not be 
unilateral, like reinterpretation. Rather, a petition for modification 
should involve the courts as an independent decisionmaker and be 
handled in an objective and fair manner that gives all parties to the 
decree the opportunity to represent their respective interests. 
Therefore, modification of consent decrees should follow a process 
 
 149. See Kodak, 63 F.3d at 102 (finding appropriate grounds to terminate the consent 
decree). 
 150. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 627 (“Yet despite their explicit adoption of Rufo, 
both courts imported a requirement not adhered to in Rufo itself .	.	.	.”). 
 151. See id. (“The extensions of Rufo by the Kodak and Western Electric courts are 
therefore somewhat innocuous, representing little more than a Swift/United Shoe analysis 
under the guise of Rufo.”). 
 152. See id. (“Due to Rufo’s generally warm reception beyond the institutional reform 
context, uncertainty persists as to whether future courts will apply Rufo literally to 
requests to modify antitrust consent decrees.”). 
 153. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 321. 
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similar to litigation but needs to be expedited in order to enable 
companies like BMI to make changes necessary for their business to 
operate efficiently in the face of technological advancements like 
music streaming. 
A counterargument here might be that litigation is typically a 
slow process that can span a number of years, so if modification 
requests are going to proceed through the courts, then one must be 
prepared to wait years for a resolution. However, the issue of 
modifying antitrust consent decrees that profoundly affect the 
operation of a multibillion-dollar industry like performance rights 
licensing is a more urgent one than a standard dispute that one might 
see in other contexts, such as routine business or employment 
litigation. While business litigation is notorious for being a long, 
drawn out process, the delay is not as troubling because the dispute at 
issue is typically more private in nature as compared to a dispute 
surrounding an antitrust consent decree. 
For instance, if a business spends years litigating whether an 
employee violated his nondisclosure agreement, that is unfortunate 
and costly for the parties but typically comes at a minor cost to the 
general public and the overarching industry in which the business 
operates. On the other hand, litigation surrounding the modification 
of a consent decree can affect the operation of an entire industry 
directly and, in a less quantifiable sense, can impact the entire 
economy when its effects are aggregated. In that sense, antitrust 
consent decrees like the one at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc. are 
more public in nature than traditional business litigation. 
Since the modification of antitrust consent decrees presents a 
more urgent question that affects a much wider swath of the 
American public than typical private business litigation, there is 
greater societal interest in resolving the consent decree dispute 
expediently. As such, streamlining litigation in the context of antitrust 
consent decrees should be elevated over efforts to expedite routine 
forms of litigation, such as business or employment disputes. 
Multiyear litigation, which has become standard in American society, 
should not be tolerated in a context like proposed modifications to 
antitrust consent decrees because of the far-reaching implications for 
an industry and the overall economy. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR CHANGES TO THE BMI CONSENT DECREE 
It is important to allow modifications of antitrust consent decrees 
because all parties have powerful interests that are profoundly linked 
to the terms of the decree. If technologies change in such a way that 
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parties find themselves in a materially worse position than at the time 
of the original agreement, then intuitive notions of fundamental 
fairness and equity would demand that the terms of the decree be 
adjusted. Oftentimes, as in the case of Broadcast Music, Inc., both 
parties want changes to the current operation of the consent decree. 
A. Reasons Why BMI Wants to Change the Consent Decree 
BMI wants to update the consent decree so that it clearly permits 
fractional licensing for several reasons, all of which are tied to the 
advent of digital music. Although fractional licensing is already the 
traditional industry practice, BMI wants to update the consent decree 
to clarify that fractional licensing is permitted. Under a fractional-
licensing regime, “BMI represents only the interests of its writers and 
publishers.”154 BMI argues that “[f]ractional licensing .	.	. is the 
efficient, common-sense way to deal with the longstanding fact that 
many songs are co-written by BMI affiliates and non-BMI affiliates 
(‘split works’).”155 In fact, the ubiquity of split works likely makes a 
full-work licensing regime untenable as a practical matter. 
BMI also wants publishers to be able “to give BMI the right to 
license works for certain uses, while permitting publishers to retain 
the exclusive right to license works for other defined, digital uses.”156 
BMI wants this change so it can offer easier and more efficient access 
to its immense collection for many traditional music uses that have 
existed for decades.157 BMI also believes the change would have the 
positive effect of providing publishers and music users with the 
opportunity to negotiate their own free-market deals in the numerous 
new digital contexts, like streaming, that could not have even been 
dreamed of when the BMI consent decree was last amended.158 The 
newest technology that has most disrupted the performance rights 
licensing industry is music streaming.159 Although music streaming is 
excellent for consumers, composers claim that they have not been 
adequately compensated in the streaming era.160 Streaming services 
 
 154. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., Review of Consent Decree in United 
States v. Broad. Music, Inc. 3 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi18.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNY4-447L]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. What Is the Consent Decree?, supra note 69. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 318. 
 160. Id. 
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like Apple, Amazon, Google, Pandora, Spotify, and Tidal, however, 
disagree with those claims of inadequate compensation.161 
Both PROs and songwriters want fractional licensing because 
they are concerned that full-work licensing would depress royalty 
rates by enabling digital music users like Spotify to shop around for 
whichever PRO is offering the lowest price.162 The fear among PROs 
and composers is that full-work licensing would lead to a “race-to-
the-bottom,” resulting in reduced license rates for PROs and lower 
royalties for composers.163 BMI also wants to clarify that it can bundle 
any rights relating to the musical work that a music user needs to 
bring its product or service to the public.164 By bundling rights, BMI 
could be a one-stop licensing source in order to meet the needs and 
match the ever-increasing pace of the digital marketplace.165 
Next, BMI wants to move the rate-setting forum from federal 
court to a binding arbitration model because it would resolve disputes 
more quickly and less expensively for all parties.166 Arbitration 
procedures have changed significantly since the Supreme Court began 
ushering in a new “Age of Arbitration” during the 1980s.167 
Consequently, arbitration has become a much more useful tool for 
efficient dispute resolution, leading to its widespread adoption in a 
range of different contexts.168 Many of these sweeping changes that 
have made the arbitration model more attractive have occurred since 
the BMI consent decree was last amended in 1994. As a result, BMI 
wants to update the consent decree to move the rate-setting court to 
binding arbitration in order to best tailor its terms to new 
circumstances that have emerged in society since the last 
modification. 
 
 161. Id. at 318−19. 
 162. See id. at 341. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Id. at 321 n.26. 
 167. Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381, 383 (2018). 
 168. See id. at 383−84 (“In the 2010s, the Court expanded on its pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence and upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, 
even when those clauses were held unconscionable under applicable state law. The Court 
also permitted businesses to insert class-action waivers into their arbitration clauses, thus 
preventing victims of illegal activity from participating in class-action litigation. The 
growing judicial deference to arbitration clauses has provided firms the ability to include 
otherwise unenforceable terms in their contracts, which may allow defendants to shorten 
statutes of limitations, to limit damages, and to prevent injunctive remedies altogether.”). 
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B. Reasons Why the DOJ Wants to Change the Consent Decree 
On the other hand, the DOJ wants 100% full-work licensing 
instead of the standard industry practice of fractional licensing.169 
Under the 100% full-work licensing regime, BMI’s licenses would 
need “to offer users the ability to perform all ‘compositions’ in its 
repertory.”170 Under full-work licensing, a BMI licensee would have 
the right to perform all co-written songs without permission to 
perform those songs from the other PRO or any other nonaffiliated 
co-writer or publisher.171 Those on the side of the PROs—songwriters 
and artists—feel that a full-work licensing scheme would “inject great 
inefficiency and confusion into the pricing, collecting, and distribution 
of performance rights royalties.”172 The inefficiency would result from 
PROs having to keep track of the proportional co-ownership interests 
of every song, even if some co-owners are not affiliated with that 
PRO. The lack of a central database containing co-ownership 
information for every song would make it especially difficult for 
PROs to comply with a full-work licensing regime. 
Broadly, the DOJ wants full-work licensing in order to preserve 
what it perceives as procompetitive benefits.173 The DOJ believes 
that, with full-work licensing, BMI licenses can provide adequate 
“protection from unintended copyright infringement liability and 
immediate access to the compositions in the organizations’ 
repertories.”174 The DOJ also argues that fractional licensing hinders 
the operation of the market for public performance licensing and 
possibly reduces the playing of music as a consequence.175 
 
 169. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 13. 
 170. Id. at 11. 
 171. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., supra note 154, at 4.  
 172. Id. (“It would also have the perverse effect, from an antitrust policy point of view, 
of undercutting an individual publisher’s ability to license their catalogs directly to music 
users (because the PROs will have already licensed any split works, which now make up a 
large portion of most publishers’ catalogs), thereby shoring up and increasing the 
bargaining power of the collective licensing organizations. At the same time, mandatory 
100% licensing by PROs would encourage opportunistic gamesmanship by any music user 
seeking to avoid paying the full value of all the rights it acquires.”). 
 173. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 13. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 13−14 (“If ASCAP and BMI were permitted to offer fractional licenses, 
music users seeking to avoid potential infringement liability would need to meticulously 
track song ownership before playing music. As the experience of ASCAP and BMI 
themselves shows, this would be no easy task.”). 
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C. Reasons Why Other Interest Groups Want to Change the Consent 
Decree 
There are additional interest groups affected by the consent 
decree that would also like to see changes in its terms. For instance, 
some songwriters believe that the consent decree is both “obsolete” 
and “outdated.”176 As songwriters have explained, “[r]ules created 
more than sixty years ago to govern the collection of America’s 
performance royalties for songwriters cannot possibly function in 
2014.”177 Songwriters want the terms of the consent decree to be 
changed in order to clarify that the terms allow fractional licensing 
because “a shift to 100% licensing would severely impact [their] 
creative freedom, [their] ability to choose .	.	. PRO licenses, [their] 
music, and, ultimately, [their] livelihood as songwriters.”178 Under 
full-work licensing, songwriters would have to collaborate only with 
fellow BMI writers in order to ensure they receive the fee to which 
they agreed for their work.179 Under a full-work regime, if a BMI 
writer collaborated with an artist belonging to a different PRO that 
charges a lower fee than BMI, then the BMI writer could be forced to 
accept the lower fee offered by the other PRO, even though the BMI 
writer had only contracted with BMI.180 
A full-work licensing model could also result in a major drain on 
songwriters’ income.181 First, full-work licensing could potentially 
delay and lower royalty payments if the payments had to flow through 
two PROs because two collaborators were affiliated with two 
different PROs.182 There would also be a serious pragmatic concern 
based on the fact that, under full-work licensing, songwriters would 
“have to monitor what [they] are being paid by a PRO [they] have no 
relationship with, figure out whether [the PRO] ha[s] missed any of 
[their] performances, understand how and when they will pay [them], 
determine whether [they] are getting [their] fair shares of bonuses 
under the other PRO’s distribution system, and so on.”183 
In addition to concerns about songwriters’ income, a full-work 
licensing regime would suppress creativity, as songwriters might have 
 
 176. Public Comment, Bart Herbison, Exec. Dir., Nashville Songwriters Ass’n Int’l, 
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to make choices about with whom they collaborate based on which 
PRO the other songwriter belongs to rather than musical talent or 
personal chemistry. This creative concern is extremely pressing, as 
“[t]he creativity and success of any songwriter stems from being able 
to work with songwriters of our choosing, regardless of their PRO 
affiliation.”184 Further, songwriters worry that  
[a]ll of a sudden, [their] individual and careful choice of [a] 
collaborator will not be driven by artistic chemistry or 
compatibility, but by rules imposed by the government. The 
100% licensing model sounds like the government stepping into 
the creative process and effectively dictating our collaborators 
and our licensing representatives.185  
This potential drain on creativity is profoundly troubling. Creativity is 
the engine behind the creation of music, and the art of music is the 
foundation of the performance rights licensing industry. Although 
economics and music have merged to form a massively profitable 
industry, the production of good music from an artistic standpoint is a 
necessary predicate for the whole industry to run. Since the 
production of good music requires creativity, a 100% full-licensing 
regime could threaten the entire music industry by curbing creativity 
among songwriters. 
One potential unintended consequence of full-work licensing 
could be that most or all composers decide to join the same PRO in 
order to avoid issues relating to collaboration between members of 
different PROs. Although unlikely, this would frustrate the DOJ’s 
purpose in entering into these consent decrees, cutting against the 
very core of antitrust principles by essentially giving one PRO a 
monopoly. A shift of all songwriters to one PRO, however, would 
require a massive coordinated movement that is unlikely to ever 
occur and, even if it did, the DOJ would likely take some type of 
action to stop it. 
V.  A NEW STANDARD FOR ASSESSING REQUESTS FOR 
MODIFICATION OF ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES 
If a new standard is needed for modification of antitrust consent 
decrees, the next step is to explore viable alternatives.  
 
 184. Id. at 2. 
 185. Id. 
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A. The Unworkability of Rufo for Antitrust Consent Decree Cases 
One possibility would be to import the Rufo standard into 
performance rights licensing jurisprudence. But, as David Konczal 
and Jed Goldfarb have both argued, applying Rufo in the context of 
antitrust consent decrees would mean forgoing many of the important 
benefits such decrees provide.186 Konczal argues that a flexible 
modification standard like Rufo would negate the public benefits that 
arise from the use of consent decrees as a means of settling antitrust 
disputes.187 Konczal argues that applying the Rufo standard in the 
antitrust context would make it too easy to change the terms and, 
therefore, would “increase the uncertainty and risk faced by antitrust 
defendants,188 would reduce the incentive of defendants to enter into 
consent decrees,189 and would lead to a waste of scarce judicial 
resources.”190 At the heart of Konczal’s argument is the notion that 
consent decrees need certainty and finality in order to function 
properly. 
At the same time, however, flexibility is needed so that terms of 
consent decrees can be modified in order to adapt to new 
technologies and other societal advancements. Flexibility is needed to 
level the playing field and should be regarded as fundamental in the 
context of modifying consent decrees. Here, circumstances have 
evolved to the point that one party is significantly disadvantaged 
relative to the other in such a way that was not contemplated at the 
time of the original consent decree.  
This idea that governmental mandates carrying the force of law 
should be updated from time to time in order to best fit the new 
circumstances that come with new generations is not a new concept.191 
 
 186. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 134; see also Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 627−28. 
 187. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 134. 
 188. “Because a liberal modification standard will likely entice the Antitrust Division 
to seek modification of existing consent decrees, applying Rufo in this context will reduce 
the certainty and risk-avoidance that defendants seek in entering into consent decrees.” 
Id. 
 189. “[A] liberal modification standard may dissuade defendants from entering into 
consent decrees because of a fear that the Antitrust Division will continuously attempt to 
intensify the restrictions imposed upon the defendants in the original decrees.” Id. 
 190. Id. “[I]t will encourage defendants and the Antitrust Division to pursue constantly 
modification of consent decrees, thereby wasting the time and money of the courts, 
defendants, and the Antitrust Division.” Id.  
 191. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 35, at 392 (“The 
question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have 
been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of such 
consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental 
principles of every government.”). 
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As noted earlier, Thomas Jefferson stated in his famous 1789 letter to 
James Madison that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; that 
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”192 With that 
statement, Jefferson set forth the idea that laws should be revisited at 
least every generation to best meet the needs of the living 
generation.193 This principle is relevant and applicable to the issue of 
modifying antiquated consent decrees in the sense that they should be 
tailored to best fit the needs of the digital age. It seems irresponsible 
to regulate performance rights licensing in the digital age under terms 
that were drafted in 1966 and amended in 1994, when the industry 
was almost unrecognizable from what it is today. 
B. The Benefits of a Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis 
Ultimately, though, the Rufo standard is not the flexible standard 
that is needed in this context.194 Instead, this Recent Development 
proposes the following standard for the modification of antitrust 
consent decrees: an antitrust consent decree shall be amended only if, 
by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the court finds a 
reasonable and necessary request for modification that does not 
unduly prejudice the other party or run counter to the public interest. 
The three major factors to consider in the analysis include the 
following: (1) the necessity, or lack thereof, of the modification 
request from the standpoint of the movant; (2) achieving a balance 
between whether refusing the request for modification would unduly 
prejudice the movant and whether granting the request would unduly 
prejudice the nonmovant; and (3) whether the policy benefits of the 
modification would outweigh the risk of encouraging more 
amendment requests by granting the change. 
Issues of antitrust consent decree modification can be so varied 
and complex that it is unlikely they can be placed neatly into a clear 
standard like Rufo, Swift, or United Shoe. As such, the totality-of-the-
circumstances reasonableness test and its accompanying framework 
of factors would capture the flexibility of the Rufo test by leaving a 
considerable amount of discretion for the courts to make decisions on 
a case-by-case basis while still imposing safeguards against Konczal’s 
concerns about certainty and finality. In this way, the proposed new 
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standard would occupy a middle ground between the inflexible Swift 
and United Shoe standard and the overly flexible Rufo standard. 
The first factor—the necessity, or lack thereof, of the proposed 
modification for the movant—is a threshold inquiry to deter frivolous 
modification requests that would reduce certainty and finality and 
waste money and the time of the courts. As such, this should be the 
weightiest factor because the court should dismiss the motion if it 
does not find it to be necessary from the standpoint of the movant. In 
carrying out the analysis, the reviewing court should take a hard look 
at the material position of the movant in the context of changed 
circumstances, as well as the intent of the movant. If the movant’s 
material position appears relatively unchanged from the time of the 
original consent decree, then that is a red flag that the amendment 
request is not necessary. In addition, if the movant’s intent appears to 
be nefarious, such as to drive up legal costs for its opponent, then that 
is also reason to dismiss the motion. 
Once necessity has been established, factor two is designed to 
promote fundamental fairness. Consideration of the first element of 
the balance in factor two—whether refusing the request for 
modification would unduly prejudice the movant—is designed to 
safeguard against undue enrichment of the nonmovant as a result of 
changed circumstances since the initial entering of the decree. 
Ensuring the requested modification is the result of circumstances 
that have changed since the original consent decree will prevent 
parties from simply requesting a modification whenever the terms of 
the original consent decree did not end up working out as they had 
hoped. This factor directs the court to only grant a modification when 
it is the result of changed circumstances and when, as a practical 
matter, fairness requires the modification. In assessing this factor, 
courts should take a hard look at the changed circumstances alleged 
by the movant and how they have affected the way the industry 
operates. If the court finds that external forces have materially 
changed the movant’s position in a way that could be fixed by 
granting the modification, then this factor should weigh in favor of 
modification. If it is unclear that the proposed modification would 
improve the position of the movant without creating a new advantage 
for the movant, then this factor should weigh in favor of refusing the 
modification as a way to deter frivolous modification requests. 
Consideration of the second element of the balance in factor 
two—whether granting the request would unduly prejudice the 
nonmoving party—is designed to ensure that the proposed 
amendment would not benefit the movant to a degree that would 
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place them at an advantage relative to the nonmovant. The idea 
would be to prevent modification requests from becoming a 
commonly used tool to gain a business advantage. Courts should look 
at the effects the modifications would have on the relative position of 
the parties, with the goal being the balance of fundamental fairness. 
The modification would be acceptable if it would improve the 
position of the movant, as that would be the point of the modification 
in the first place. But the important thing is that the movant’s position 
does not become improved past the point of fundamental fairness to a 
point where the nonmovant becomes the disadvantaged party. If 
granting the request would improve the standing of the moving party 
at the expense of the nonmoving party beyond the equilibrium of 
fundamental fairness, then this factor should weigh in favor of 
rejecting the modification. 
The third factor—whether the policy benefits of the modification 
would outweigh the risk of encouraging more amendment requests by 
granting the change—represents a broad catchall and simply asks the 
court to weigh the overall policy implications of the proposed 
modification against the negative policy concerns associated with the 
general practice of allowing parties to modify consent decrees.195 This 
factor is intended to be broad as a way for the court to keep an eye 
out for society in the rare case that a proposed modification may pass 
the other factors and be equitable among the parties but have 
detrimental effects to the industry, the economy, or society as a 
whole. 
C. The Unworkability of a Legislative Solution 
A wholesale alternative to the judicial standard proposed above 
would be to adopt a comprehensive legislative solution that governs 
the business of performance rights licensing. In fact, the DOJ has 
suggested replacing the consent decree model with a legislative 
scheme in the future but recognizes that the consent decree model is 
too entrenched to be changed at this time.196 While that alternative 
 
 195. For a discussion of these policy implications, see supra notes 191−94 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 22 (“The Division recognizes the 
incongruity in the oversight over the licensing of performance rights and other copyrights 
in compositions and sound recordings and believes that the protections provided by the 
consent decrees could be addressed through a legislative solution that brings performance 
rights licensing under a similar regulatory umbrella as other rights. The Division 
encourages the development of a comprehensive legislative solution that ensures a 
competitive marketplace and obviates the need for continued Division oversight of the 
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would remove consent decrees from the equation, it would frustrate 
the main rationale behind the use of consent decrees in the first place: 
efficiency.197 While the almost five-year delay since BMI’s initial 
modification request seems like a long time, the political and 
legislative process could potentially take even longer. 
First, PROs would need to lobby the necessary lawmakers in 
order to gain support, which could take years. In addition, there could 
be serious inequities that arise during the lobbying process. For 
instance, a wealthy corporation like Spotify might have much more 
political influence than a coalition of songwriters. If the interests of 
those two groups clashed, companies like Spotify would be better 
equipped to pursue change through the legislative process. As a 
practical matter, there would be no remedy for that disparity in power 
with respect to shaping the eventual laws and regulations. On the 
other hand, consent decrees provide for more equal bargaining power 
among the involved parties. 
Even if a party were to convince enough lawmakers of its 
proposed legislation, those lawmakers would still need to wait for the 
opportune time to introduce the bill to ensure that it gets passed. That 
timeline could be at the mercy of the current partisan makeup in 
Congress or many other factors. In that sense, subjecting antitrust 
regulation to the political process would only magnify Konczal’s 
concerns about certainty and finality. 
In addition, replacing antitrust consent decrees with standard 
legislation would unavoidably import the pitfalls of party politics, 
special interest lobbies, and other imperfections from the political 
system into the decision-making process. For instance, lawmakers on 
the side of BMI would inevitably need to relinquish some demands as 
a compromise in order to get the necessary votes to pass the bill. As a 
result, a legislative scheme would take the act of compromising out of 
the hands of the parties who are actually involved and instead place 
the ability to compromise in the hands of lawmakers who are likely 
detached and disinterested in comparison to the actual parties to the 
decree. 
The political process tends to be more transparent than the 
confidential negotiation process through which consent decrees are 
born. Intuitively, it seems much more efficient to have the parties who 
will be relying upon the decree negotiating its terms in a confidential 
setting. Therefore, the parties are most likely to arrive at the fairest 
reasonable compromise because they can negotiate based purely on 
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their own material interests, free from external political pressures that 
may have little or no basis in the practical operation of the consent 
decree. 
Furthermore, members of Congress do not have the same 
expertise about emerging technologies that are changing the 
performance rights licensing landscape.198 In fact, “[e]ven members of 
Congress acknowledged their limited ability to keep abreast of 
technological developments for the delivery of music” during 
meetings with the Nashville Songwriters Association.199 Without such 
intimate knowledge of pertinent issues, lawmakers are unlikely to 
formulate a fairer solution than a consent decree that is agreed upon 
by parties who possess strong familiarity with the industry and have 
the incentive to protect their own material interests. 
Although songwriters and artists gained some relief through the 
legislative process by getting the MMA passed and signed into law, it 
was far from a complete and wholesale solution for the problems 
afflicting BMI and the performance rights licensing industry.200 
Without a doubt, the MMA was a significant victory for rights 
holders, as it will hopefully assuage their most pressing concern by 
ensuring that they get paid. The consent decrees between the DOJ 
and PROs, however, are still in existence and were not rendered 
defunct by the legislation. As a result, the discussion surrounding the 
modification decrees remains pertinent. Nonetheless, the MMA 
serves to show the potential viability of a legislative solution in certain 
circumstances. 
D. The Federal Trade Commission as a Potential Alternate Forum 
Another alternative would be for Congress to turn enforcement 
of antitrust consent decrees over to a special division of the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”). Given that agencies usually hold more 
expertise than lawmakers, such an alternative could potentially work 
if the proper procedures and safeguards were implemented. 
Considering the high stakes that come with modifying a consent 
decree, especially since they affect how a multibillion-dollar industry 
is regulated, it would be concerning to give the FTC unilateral power 
to change antitrust consent decrees.201 Nonetheless, a quasi-judicial 
model, where both sides have the chance to argue their positions 
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before an independent decisionmaker within the FTC, could 
potentially be a viable option. 
Even if it is assumed that consent decrees are a better solution 
than the legislative process, the current controversy between BMI 
and the DOJ indicates the necessity of some level of flexibility with 
respect to modifying the terms of a decree. The nature of the industry 
is such that changing technologies can demand changes to the consent 
decree by entirely transforming the way business is transacted. In the 
case of Broadcast Music, Inc., the advent of digital music is the main 
technological advancement that has led to calls for change to the 
consent decree. 
The new standard proposed in this Recent Development 
combines the flexibility of Rufo with safeguards against its main 
policy concerns. In addition, the flexibility of the Rufo standard is 
enhanced by the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and the 
inclusion of the broad catchall in the third factor, which gives the 
court a license to strike down a modification proposal if it would 
result in negative policy consequences such as those contemplated by 
Goldfarb and Konczal. 
CONCLUSION 
In Broadcast Music, Inc., the district court and later the Second 
Circuit correctly struck down the DOJ’s attempt to alter the terms of 
the BMI consent decree through a proposed reinterpretation. The 
court’s decision was proper both as a technical adherence to 
precedent and as a normative matter. Nonetheless, involved parties 
need another way to make changes to consent decrees in order to 
adapt to ever-changing external forces. The DOJ could stop using 
antitrust consent decrees to regulate music licensing, but then the 
leading alternative would be to regulate through the political process. 
The use of consent decrees, however, is better than a legislative 
scheme because it increases efficiency and fairness, and it keeps 
decisionmakers independent from the political process. As a result, 
the best alternative for making necessary changes to consent decrees 
is through the process of modification. Unfortunately, the current 
body of law with respect to modification is too rigid and does not 
allow parties to make the changes necessary to maintain the efficacy 
of the consent decree in response to a rapidly changing technological 
environment. 
In order to make the modification process more flexible and less 
arduous while maintaining the safeguards that underlie the current 
modification doctrine, courts should use a totality-of-the-
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circumstances test to assess a proposed modification to an antitrust 
consent decree. The proposed totality-of-the-circumstances test and 
its accompanying factors provides a court with a framework for 
assessing the reasonableness and necessity of a proposed modification 
while safeguarding against unfairness, frivolous claims, and other 
critiques of flexible standards such as the Rufo standard. The 
flexibility of the proposed new standard is important because it levels 
the playing field in situations in which circumstances have evolved to 
the point that one party is severely disadvantaged relative to the 
other. 
Although this Recent Development focused on antitrust consent 
decrees in the context of the performance rights licensing industry, 
the new test it sets forth could potentially be extended to the review 
of modification requests in other industries that the DOJ regulates 
through consent decrees.202 While not all other industries may be as 
inextricably linked to changing technologies as the performance rights 
licensing business, all industries need to adapt to changing societal 
circumstances to some extent. At the very least, having the ability to 
make reasonable changes to a consent decree is an advantage for any 
industry. Regardless of the industry, there is never a reason to 
continue being governed by outdated regulations when there is a 
reasonable way to update them. 
Scholars have warned that giving too much flexibility in changing 
a consent decree can be problematic because it can undermine the 
certainty and finality that are required for consent decrees to function 
in the regulatory context.203 However, the standard proposed in this 
Recent Development has safeguards built into its framework to 
protect against those concerns. Although many specific issues facing 
other industries may be unique from those facing the performance 
rights licensing business, the proposed new standard represents a 
broad enough framework for it to be useful in the regulation of other 
industries and other contexts, such as institutional reform litigation or 
the regulation of prison conditions. As such, the totality-of-the-
circumstances test for reviewing requests to modify consent decrees 
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could enhance the efficiency and efficacy of many industries that are 
regulated by consent decrees and, in turn, contribute to the overall 
prosperity of the American economy. 
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